The Seat Belt Issue: Judicial Disregard for Legislative Action by Stein, Terri
THE SEAT BELT ISSUE: JUDICIAL
DISREGARD FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION
I. INTRODUCTION
Although the Alaska Legislature has decided not to require
Alaska motorists to wear seat belts,1 the Alaska Supreme Court has
held in Hutchins v. Schwartz2 that evidence of an injured plaintiff's
failure to wear a seat belt is admissible to a jury on the issue of appor-
tioning damages in an automobile negligence suit.3 Thus, while the
legislature has declined to mandate seat belt use as a required standard
of conduct in Alaska, a person who fails to wear a seat belt and is
injured by a negligent motorist may be penalized. In effect, the Alaska
Supreme Court overruled the legislature's decision not to require seat
belt use with a holding that may indirectly coerce Alaskans into wear-
ing seat belts.
On Tuesday, April 29, 1986, Judiciary Committee Substitute
House Bill 224 ("CSHB 224") failed to pass the Alaska House on
reconsideration.4 The passage of CSHB 224 would have required
drivers and passengers to wear their seat belts while occupying motor
vehicles, 5 and would have placed Alaska among the growing number
of states that have adopted mandatory seat belt use laws.6
Nonetheless, despite more than fourteen months of legislative debate
Copyright © 1987 by Alaska Law Review
1. Judiciary Comm. Sub. H. 224, 14th Leg., 2d Sess. (1985) [hereinafter CSHB
224].
2. 724 P.2d 1194 (Alaska 1986).
3. Id. at 1199.
4. CSHB 224, supra note 1.
5. HousE J., 14th Leg., 2d Sess. 2984 (Apr. 29, 1986).
6. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 27315 (West Supp. 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 14-1002 (West Supp. 1987); D.C. CODE ANN. § 40-1602 (1986); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 316.614 (West Supp. 1987); HAW. REV. STAT. § 291-11.6 (1985); IDAHO CODE
§ 49-764 (Supp. 1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95 1/2 para. 12-603.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 9-8-14-1 (Bums 1987); IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.445 (West
Supp. 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-2503 (1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:295.1
(West Supp. 1987); MD. ANN. CODE § 22-412.3 (Supp. 1986); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 257.710e(3) (West Supp. 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.686 (West 1986);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 307.178 (West Supp. 1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:3-76.2f (West
Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-7-372 (Supp. 1986); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW
§ 1229-L (McKinney 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-135.2A (Supp. 1985); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 4513.263(B) (Supp. 1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 12-417 (West
Supp. 1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-9-603 (Supp. 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-
182 (Supp. 1987); WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 46.61.688 (1987).
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and discussion and testimony from citizen and special interest groups, 7
the bill failed by a vote of twenty to twenty.8
Although the House did not adopt mandatory use legislation
("MUL"), the effort to lay down public policy in this area has been
heeded. On September 12, 1986, in Hutchins v. Schwartz,9 the Alaska
Supreme Court unanimously held that in automobile negligence suits,
a jury is permitted to consider a plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt
for the purpose of apportioning damages.10 In determining that seat
belt use is relevant to a proper apportioning of damages," the court
maintained that it did not create a duty to wear seat belts; rather, it
simply applied the concept of comparative negligence.12 Despite this
relatively innocuous characterization, when viewed in light of the ex-
plosive controversy surrounding the seat belt issue,' 3 the court's deci-
sion appears to be a judicial mandate with coercive force equal to the
legislative one debated and abandoned by the Alaska Legislature.
7. CSHB 224 originally was introduced on February 22, 1985. HOUSE J., 14th
Leg., 2d Sess. 413 (Feb. 22, 1985).
On March 27, 1985, private citizens as well as representatives from the following
organizations appeared before the House State Affairs Standing Committee to testify
concerning CSHB 224: Alaska Public Interest Research Group; Highway Safety
Planning Agency, Department of Transportation and Public Facilities; National Asso-
ciation of Rural Letter Carriers; Regional Coordinator for Seatbelts on School Buses;
Emergency Medical Services-Homer Volunteer Fire Department; Alaska Women's
Commission; and Alaska Safety Advisory Council. Minutes of the House State Af-
fairs Standing Committee, Mar. 27, 1985.
On April 2, 1985, representatives from Emergency Medical Services and Allstate
and State Farm insurance companies appeared before the House State Affairs Stand-
ing Committee to testify on CSHB 224. Minutes of the House State Affairs Standing
Committee, Apr. 3, 1985. On April 30, 1985, several citizens and interested groups,
most of whom are referred to above, made their views on the proposed legislation
known. Minutes of the House Judiciary Standing Committee, Apr. 30, 1985.
8. CSHB 224, supra note 1.
9. 724 P.2d 1194 (Alaska 1986).
10. Id. at 1199.
11. Id.
12. Id. The doctrine of comparative negligence was judicially adopted in Kaatz v.
State, 540 P.2d 1037, 1049 (Alaska 1975).
13. Sometimes referred to as the "seat belt defense," the question of whether evi-
dence of a plaintiff's failure to wear seat belts should be admissible in court has been
debated hotly during the past two decades. See, e.g., Hoglund & Parsons, Caveat
Viator: The Duty to Wear Seat Belts Under Comparative Negligence Law, 50 WASH.
L. REV. 1 (1974); Kleist, The Seat Belt Defense-An Exercise in Sophistry, 18 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 613 (1967); Kropoth, Mandatory Seat Belt Usage in New Jersey, 9 SETON
HALL LEGIS. J. 549 (1986); McChrystal, Seat Belt Negligence: The Ambivalent Wis-
consin Rules, Foley v. City of West Allis, 68 MARQ. L. REv. 539 (1985); Note, Seat
Belt Defense- Whether They Know It or Not Florida Motorists Must Buckle Up or Risk
Loss of Full Recovery, 12 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 669 (1984); Note, Florida's Reasonable
Prudent Motorists No Longer Can Afford Not to Buckle Up, 36 MERCER L. REV. 1041
(1985); Note, The Seat Belt Defense: A Comprehensive Guide for the Trial Lawyer and
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This note traces the development of what has been coined the
"seat belt defense,"14 presents its legal rationale, and describes its in-
creasing acceptance throughout the country. The note places particu-
lar emphasis on the Alaska Supreme Court's questionable
justifications for creating the defense and its reasons for ruling that
evidence of non-use is admissible to determine comparative negligence.
This note concludes that because the Alaska Legislature decided not
to adopt a seat belt law, and because a majority of Alaskans fail to
wear seat belts, the court lacked justification when it permitted evi-
dence of non-use to go to the jury.
II. THE ORIGIN AND LEGAL RATIONALE FOR
THE SEAT BELT DEFENSE
The seat belt defense originated in the Wisconsin case of Stock-
inger v. Dunisch. 15 In this case, the trial judge's ruling permitted the
jury to consider the plaintiff's failure to use an available seat belt.
This ruling was based upon the premise that by requiring the installa-
tion of seat belts, 16 the Wisconsin Legislature implicitly required their
use. 17 While the courts that have addressed this particular rationale
have rejected it overwhelmingly, 18 the proposition that a plaintiff's
Suggested Approach for the Courts, 56 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 272 (1980); Note, Seat
Belt Negligence in Automobile Accidents, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 288.
14. In Hutchins v. Schwartz, 724 P.2d 1194 (Alaska 1986), the Supreme Court of
Alaska states:
We conclude that the failure to wear a seat belt is relevant evidence for the
purpose of damage reduction. However, we do not choose to categorize
such evidence as a "seat belt defense." Rather, the concept of comparative
negligence contemplates the inclusion of all relevant factors in arriving at the
appropriate damages award and non-use of a seat belt is a relevant factor for
apportioning damages.
Id. at 1199. Because the effect of the characterization would be the same if it were
labeled the "seat belt defense," for the purposes of this note, the court's ruling will be
treated as an adoption of the "seat belt defense."
15. See 5 FOR THE DEFENSE 79 (1966) (noting Wisconsin trial court decision
wherein plaintiff motorist who failed to wear seat belt during collision was found neg-
ligent by jury; negligence was assessed at 10%, which was to be deducted from dam-
age award).
16. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 347.48(1) (West 1971 & Supp. 1986) (requiring seat belts
in any automobile of 1962 model or later that is bought, sold, traded, or transferred at
retail).
17. Stockinger, noted in 5 FOR THE DEFENSE at 79 ("It... must follow that the
legislature intended that these seat belts be used in certain circumstances.")
18. The majority of courts have rejected the conclusion that statutes requiring the
installation of seat belts implicitly require their use. See, e.g., Hutchins, 724 P.2d
1194, 1197 (Alaska 1986); Romankiewiz v. Black, 16 Mich. App. 119, 124, 167
N.W.2d 606, 609 (1969); Miller v. Haynes, 454 S.W.2d 293, 300 (Mo. App. 1970);
Kopischke v. First Continental Corp., 187 Mont. 471, 492, 610 P.2d 668, 679 (1980);
Amend v. Bell, 89 Wash. 2d 124, 132, 570 P.2d 138, 143 (1977).
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failure to wear a seat belt might constitute a legitimate defense to neg-
ligence has occasionally met with approval.19
The limited success 20 of the seat belt defense cannot be attributed
to defendants' unwillingness to assert it. Defendants have argued re-
peatedly for the seat belt defense and have based their contentions on
three alternative rationales. First, defendants have argued that the
19. See, e.g., Insurance Co. of North America v. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d 447, 449
(Fla. 1984); see also Mays v. Dealer Transit, Inc., 441 F.2d 1344, 1355 (7th Cir. 1971)
(wearing a seat belt is sufficiently involved in the matter of the exercise of due care as
to present an issue of common law negligence under proper circumstances); Cierpisz
v. Singleton, 247 Md. 215, 224, 230 A.2d 629, 634 (1967) (there is a duty, based on an
ordinary standard of care, to use available seat belts); Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444,
449, 323 N.E.2d 164, 167, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916, 920 (1974) (plaintiff's non-use of seat
belt and relevant expert testimony is a question for the jury); Sams v. Sams, 247 S.C.
467, 470, 148 S.E.2d 154, 155 (1966) (allegation of contributory negligence based on
failure to use seat belt should not have been stricken from pleading).
20. Several states have precluded the defense through legislative fiat. See CAL.
VEH. CODE § 27315(i) (West Supp. 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-100a(4)
(West Supp. 1987); D.C. CODE ANN. § 40-1607 (1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95 1A
para. 12-603.1(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 9-8-14-5 (Burns
1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-2504 (1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:295.IE (West
Supp. 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 1368-A (1978); MD. ANN. CODE § 22-
412.3(a)(2) (Supp. 1986); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 169.685 (West 1986); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 66-7-373 (Supp. 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-135 2A(d) (Supp. 1985); OHio
REV. CODE ANN. § 4513.263(G) (Supp. 1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 12-420
(West Supp. 1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-9-604 (Supp. 1980) (repealed effective
1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-186 (Supp. 1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-309.1(b)
(1986); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 46.61.688(6) (1987).
A substantial number of other states have precluded the defense through judicial
fiat. See Nash v. Kamrath, 21 Ariz. App. 530, 532, 521 P.2d 161, 163 (1974) (no duty
to anticipate another's negligence); Churning v. Staples, 628 P.2d 180, 181 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1981) (seat belt defense not available to determine negligence under comparative
negligence statute); Melesko v. Riley, 32 Conn. Supp. 89, 90, 339 A.2d 479, 480 (1975)
(no seat belt defense since non-use is never proximate cause of accident); Lipscomb v.
Diamiani, 226 A.2d 914, 918 (Del. Super. Ct. 1967) (legislative forum is best for ex-
ploring this area); McCord v. Green, 362 A.2d 720, 725 (D.C. 1976) (court declines to
hold that non-use amounts to negligence since such a holding would assume that the
usual practice of the motoring public is to wear belts); Clarkson v. Wright, 108 111. 2d
129, 133-34, 483 N.E.2d 268, 270 (1985) (no statutory or other duty to wear seat
belts); State v. Ingram, 427 N.E.2d 444, 448 (Ind. 1981) (no duty to wear belt unless
legislature rules); Schmitzer v. Misener-Bennett Ford, Inc., 135 Mich. App. 350, 360,
354 N.W.2d 336, 340 (1984) (evidence of non-use is inadmissible); D.W. Boutwell Co.
v. Smith, 244 So. 2d 11 (Miss. 1971) (failure to wear seat belt does not constitute
negligence); Miller v. Haynes, 454 S.W.2d 293, 300 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970) (statutes
merely requiring installation of seat belts suggest non-use not meant to be punished);
Kopischke v. First Continental Corp., 187 Mont. 471, 500, 610 P.2d 668, 683 (1980)
(rejecting seat belt defense); Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 233, 160 S.E.2d 65, 71
(1968) (any duty to wear seat belts should be imposed by the legislature); Fields v.
Volkswagen of America, 555 P.2d 48, 62 (Okla. 1976) (should defer to legislature);
Robinson v. Lewis, 254 Or. 52, 55, 457 P.2d 483, 484 (1969) (determination should be
made by legislature that seat belt use is mandatory); Amend v. Bell, 89 Wash. 2d 124,
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failure to wear an available seat belt is negligence per se.21 Second,
defendants have argued that the failure to wear an available seat belt
should be considered by the trier of fact in determining whether the
plaintiff was contributorily negligent in failing to exercise due care.22
Third, defendants have argued that the failure to wear an available
seat belt constitutes conduct in disregard of the plaintiff's best inter-
ests and should be considered for the purpose of assessing damages to
the extent that such damages may be traced to the failure to wear a
seat belt.23
The courts that have considered the first rationale have uniformly
rejected it. Specifically, they have disagreed with the idea that non-use
constitutes negligence per se2 4 and that, therefore, the plaintiff's recov-
ery should be completely barred in jurisdictions subscribing to contrib-
utory negligence and partially barred in jurisdictions with comparative
132, 470 P.2d 138, 143 (1977) (premise of negligence is that actor has a legally im-
posed duty to uphold a particular standard of conduct; the legislature has not imposed
such a duty and neither will the judiciary).
Several other states have adopted the defense and allow the jury to consider a
plaintiff's failure to buckle up in apportioning damages. See Mays v. Dealers Transit,
Inc., 441 F.2d 1344, 1355 (7th Cir. 1971) (failure to wear seat belt is sufficiently in-
volved in exercise of reasonable care to present issue of common law negligence under
proper circumstances); Hutchins v. Schwartz, 724 P.2d 1194 (Alaska 1986); Insurance
Co. of North America v. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1984); Barry v. Coca Cola,
99 N.J. Super. 270, 280-82, 239 A.2d 273, 279-80 (1967) (court may find in future that
apportionment of damages based on plaintiff's failure to wear seat belt is, under cer-
tain circumstances, appropriate); Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 449, 323 N.E.2d
164, 167, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916, 920 (1974) (non-use and relevant expert testimony pres-
ent relevant question for jury); Sams v. Sams, 247 S.C. 467, 470, 148 S.E.2d 154, 155
(1966) (allegation of contributory negligence, based on failure to wear seat belt, should
not have been stricken from pleadings); Foley v. City of West Allis, 113 Wis. 2d 475,
335 N.W.2d 824 (1983).
21. E.g., Cierpisz v. Singleton, 247 Md. 215, 224, 230 A.2d 629, 634 (1967);
Robinson v. Lewis, 254 Or. 52, 55, 457 P.2d 483, 484 (1969); cf Hutchins v.
Schwartz, 724 P.2d 1194, 1198 (Alaska 1986).
22. See, e.g., Mays v. Dealers Transit, Inc., 441 F.2d 1344, 1355 (7th Cir. 1971);
Barry v. Coca Cola, 99 N.J. Super. 270, 280-82, 239 A.2d 273, 279-80 (1967); Bentzler
v. Braun, 34 Wis. 2d 362, 387, 149 N.W.2d 626, 640 (1967).
23. See, e.g., Insurance Co. of North America v. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d 447, 454
(Fla. 1984); Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 449, 323 N.E.2d 164, 168, 363 N.Y.S.2d
916, 920 (1974).
24. See, e.g., Cierpisz v. Singleton, 247 Md. 215, 224, 230 A.2d 629, 634 (1967)
("not negligence per se to fail to use seat belts where the only statutory standard is one
that requires the installation of the seat belts in the vehicle"); Robinson v. Lewis, 254
Or. 52, 55, 457 P.2d 483, 484 (1969) (absent legislative mandate a failure to wear seat
belts does not constitute negligence per se); cf Hutchins, 724 P.2d at 1198 (court
suggests that plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt in jurisdiction with MUL would
constitute negligence per se).
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negligence. 25 The consensus of these courts is that only upon the
adoption of MUL, which would create a legal duty to wear seat belts,
would non-use constitute negligence per se.26
The second rationale raises the inquiry as to whether a reasonably
prudent person in similar circumstances would have worn a seat belt.
It assumes that, independent of a statutory mandate, the failure to
wear an available seat belt is a relevant fact in determining whether
the plaintiff exercised due care. If a jury found that failure to buckle
up constituted a failure to exercise ordinary care, and that a causal
link existed between non-use and the subsequent injuries, evidence of
non-use would be admissible to show contributory negligence.27
While this approach to the seat belt issue enjoys moderate sup-
port,28 the greatest obstacles to its wider acceptance are the longstand-
ing tort principles that: (1) a tortfeasor may not rely on a plaintiff's
failure to utilize a voluntary protective device to prevent damage
caused by the tortfeasor's own negligence, 29 and (2) plaintiffs have the
right to assume that others will exercise due care. Courts recognize
and grapple with the fact that if the tortfeasor had exercised ordinary
care the plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt would have been inconse-
quential.30 The proposition that non-use constitutes a failure to exer-
cise due care lacks significant support partly because such a rule would
adversely affect the vast majority of people; in jurisdictions without
MUL the majority of people do not wear seat belts.31
The third rationale for adoption of the seat belt defense is that
non-use constitutes unreasonable behavior in disregard of the plain-
tiff's best interests; thus, non-use should preclude recovery of those
damages that would not have occurred but for the failure to wear a
25. Cierpisz v. Singleton, 247 Md. 215, 224, 230 A.2d 629, 634 (1967); Robinson
v. Lewis, 254 Or. 52, 55, 457 P.2d 483, 484 (1969); cf Hutchins, 724 P.2d at 1198.
26. E.g., Cierpisz, 247 Md. at 227, 230 A.2d at 635.
27. E.g., Mays v. Dealers Transit, Inc., 441 F.2d 1344, 1355 (7th Cir. 1971);
Barry v. Coca Cola, 99 N.J. Super. 270, 280-82, 239 A.2d 273, 279-80 (1967); Bentzler
v. Braun, 34 Wis. 2d 362, 387, 149 N.W.2d 626, 640 (1967).
28. See Fischer v. Moore, 183 Colo. 392, 394-95, 517 P.2d 458, 459 (1973); cf
Dahl v. Bayerische Motoren Werke, 84 Or. App. 483, 734 P.2d 387 (1987) (in product
liability crashworthiness action, failure to wear seat belt does not constitute compara-
tive fault because the failure did not contribute to the accident).
29. See Nash v. Kamrath, 21 Ariz. App. 530, 532, 521 P.2d 161, 163 (1974);
Lipscomb v. Diamiani, 226 A.2d 914, 918 (Del. Super. Ct. 1967).
30. 451 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1984).
31. See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP. NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINIS-
TRATION, OCCUPANT PROTECTION FAcTS, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATISTICS AND
ANALYSIS (July 1987) [hereinafter "NHTSA"] ("Currently, safety belt use in states
that have passed use laws averages about 45 percent.").
NHTSA conducts annual observational surveys in 19 cities to measure national
seat belt use. In the first half of 1987, belt use in the 12 cities with MUL was 51%;
during the same time period, belt use in the seven cities without MUL was 27%.
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seat belt. This rationale was adopted recently in Insurance Co. of
North America v. Pasakarnis.32 In that case, the Supreme Court of
Florida concluded that the importance of the seat belt as a safety de-
vice, and the minimal effort required for its use, made non-use a perti-
nent factor for jury consideration.33 In Pasakarnis, the court ruled
that to benefit from a reduction of damages, a defendant asserting the
seat belt defense has the burden of proving that: (1) the plaintiff failed
to use an available, operational belt, (2) such failure was unreasonable
under the circumstances, and that (3) there was a causal relationship
between plaintiff's injuries and the failure to wear a seat belt.34 This
theory has been criticized for the uncertainty arising from the "under
the circumstances" approach to the seat belt issue. Courts have de-
clared that, in the interests of certainty and uniformity, a bright-line
rule should determine whether a duty to wear a seat belt exists.
35
The Pasakarnis court defended its ruling as an appropriate exer-
cise of judicial discretion on the ground that major changes in Florida
tort law have been the product of judicial rulings. The court expressed
its belief that it was responsible for updating the law as society and
technology progressed. 36 Like the Hutchins court, the Pasakarnis
court has overlooked the role of the state legislature in reconciling the
law with public policy.
Much of the judicial reluctance to recognize the seat belt defense
is attributable to the inherent difficulty of fitting the defense within the
well-established tort doctrines of contributory negligence and avoid-
ance of consequences. The doctrine of contributory negligence 37 is a
liability doctrine and not a damages doctrine. Therefore, it applies to
conduct before the plaintiff suffers from any wrongdoing and bars re-
covery if the plaintiff's negligent act or failure to act proximately
causes the injury.38 When a plaintiff fails to wear a seat belt, that fail-
ure may aggravate the injuries, but it does not contribute to the occur-
rence of the accident. The standard definition of contributory
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 451.
35. See Lipscomb v. Diamiani, 226 A.2d 914, 918 (Del. Super. Ct. 1967) ("An
occupant of a car involved in normal, everyday driving should either be required to
wear a seat belt or he should not.").
36. Clarkson v. Wright, 108 Ill. 2d 129, 134, 483 N.E.2d 268, 270 (1985);
Romankewiz v. Black, 16 Mich. App. 119, 126-27, 167 N.W.2d 606, 610 (1969).
37. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 931 (5th ed. 1979) (contributory negligence
defined as the "act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on part of com-
plaining party, which, concurring with defendant's negligence, is proximate cause of
injury").
38. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 463 (1965); Kavanagh v. Butorac,
221 N.E.2d 824, 829-30 (Ind. App. 1966).
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negligence, therefore, does not support the seat belt defense. More-
over, from a public policy standpoint, courts would be reluctant to
support the application of a doctrine that would bar one hundred per-
cent of a plaintiff's recovery because of the failure to wear a seat belt.
Although the doctrine of avoidable consequences39 is a damages
doctrine, its inapplicability to the seat belt defense also stems from
timing. While contributory negligence focuses on the plaintiff's con-
duct before injury, avoidable consequences directs attention to the
plaintiff's conduct following the infliction of harm and bars recovery
of those damages that reasonably could have been avoided.40 Assum-
ing arguendo that a plaintiff who neglects to wear a seat belt is guilty
of negligence, such negligence takes place before any accident. Once
an accident occurs, it is too late to buckle up; the plaintiff can do noth-
ing to minimize damages. Thus, courts must be willing to distort the
doctrine of avoidable consequences in order to apply it to a plaintiff's
failure to wear a seat belt since the doctrine contemplates a post-acci-
dent inquiry and in this instance it is only useful from the pre-accident
perspective.41
Since its inception in 1964, the seat belt defense has failed to ac-
quire greater judicial support due to concern that seat belt use was not
always desirable. Seat belt use was believed to increase the likelihood
of death in instances where a car was submerged or on fire.42 While
this particular concern is no longer as significant as it once was, 43 a
new concern has arisen as to whether the adoption of the seat belt
defense would lead to a battle of experts over whether certain injuries
would have occurred, or been less severe, had a seat belt been worn.44
III. THE SEAT BELT DEFENSE IN ALASKA
As a result of the recent failure of CSHB 224 to pass the House,
the State of Alaska has no law requiring seat belt use. Closely related
39. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 124-25 (5th ed. 1979) (doctrine of avoidable
consequences "imposes a duty on person injured to minimize damages").
40. See Clarkson v. Wright, 108 Ill. 2d 129, 134, 483 N.E.2d 268, 270 (1985);
Kavanagh v. Butorac, 221 N.E.2d 824 (Ind. App. 1966).
41. See Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 239, 160 S.E.2d 65, 74 (1968) (doctrine of
avoidable consequences implicates plaintiff's unreasonable conduct after injury); cf
Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 323 N.E.2d 161, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1974) (creating
exception to standard legal classification of doctrine of avoidable consequences to ac-
commodate seat belt defense).
42. See Fields v. Volkswagen of America, 555 P.2d 48, 62 (Okla. 1976) (belts
confine and restrict movement and may magnify motorists' fear of entrapment in a
burning or submerged vehicle).
43. See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP. NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINIS-
TRATION, THE AUTOMOBILE SAFETY BELT FACT BOOK, at 16 (1983) ("[L]ess than
one-half of one percent of all accidents result in fire or submersion of the vehicle.").
44. See Amend v. Bell, 89 Wash. 2d 124, 132, 570 P.2d 138, 143 (1977).
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to the absence of a direct statutory mandate is the Alaska Supreme
Court's refusal to interpret the Alaska Administrative Code provision,
which requires passenger cars manufactured after January 1, 1965, to
have safety belts installed, to indirectly require their use.4 5 Because
there is neither a direct nor an implied use requirement, the failure of a
plaintiff in Alaska to wear a seat belt does not constitute negligence
per se.46 The court must justify its ruling, permitting the submission
of evidence of seat belt use to the jury, on other grounds.
The theory that non-use is at least a relevant factor in determin-
ing whether a plaintiff exercised due care47 is worthy of more extensive
consideration. This argument proceeds as follows: a reasonably pru-
dent person knows of the likelihood of being involved in an automobile
accident and the protection afforded by a seat belt; therefore, a motor-
ist in a comparative negligence jurisdiction4 8 who neglects to wear a
seat belt fails to exercise due care. A motorist who fails to exercise due
care should not be permitted to recover damages for the injuries or
aggravation of injuries caused by such comparative negligence.
A. Development of the Defense
The line of reasoning delineated above was recently applied in the
case of Hutchins v. Schwartz.49 This dispute resulted from an automo-
bile collision after which Hutchins sued Schwartz for $275,000 in
compensatory damages. Hutchins filed a motion in limine to exclude
evidence of his failure to wear a seat belt. Judge Souter denied the
motion and held that evidence of non-use constituted admissible evi-
dence relevant to the jury's determination of an appropriate damage
award.50
Following the trial, Judge Souter granted Hutchins' motion for a
directed verdict on the issue of admissibility of evidence of non-use of
a seat belt because he found that Schwartz had presented insufficient
evidence that: (1) the seat belt was working properly, and (2) Hutch-
ins' injuries were caused by his failure to wear the seat belt. The jury
then was instructed to disregard all evidence pertaining to the seat belt
issue. Nonetheless, the jury returned a verdict finding Hutchins forty
percent negligent and Schwartz sixty percent negligent, and awarded
Hutchins $1,937.09 in damages. In entering its judgment, the court
found that Schwartz was the prevailing party and thus entitled to
45. See Hutchins v. Schwartz, 724 P.2d 1194, 1198 (Alaska 1986) (interpreting
ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 04.270(a) (Dec. 1961)).
46. Id. at 1197.
47. See supra notes 26-34 and accompanying text.
48. See supra note 12.
49. 724 P.2d 1194, 1197 (Alaska 1986).
50. Id. at 1196.
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$17,000 in attorney's fees. Hutchins moved for a judgment notwith-
standing the verdict and a new trial. The motion was denied.
On appeal, Hutchins claimed that the trial court erred by: (1) ad-
mitting evidence of his failure to wear a seat belt, (2) denying his mo-
tion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and (3) finding
Schwartz the prevailing party and awarding him attorney's fees.
Schwartz responded that the court did not abuse its discretion in al-
lowing the jury to hear evidence of Hutchins' failure to wear a seat
belt. Schwartz insisted that even if the court's admission of evidence
of non-use constituted error, the error was harmless* in view of the
directed verdict and curative instruction. Additionally, Schwartz
cross-appealed the trial court's award of costs.5 1 The Alaska Supreme
Court affirmed, finding that in light of the curative instruction to the
jury, "the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence
of Hutchins' failure to wear a seat belt."' 52
B. Criticism of the Seat Belt Defense
In Hutchins, the Alaska Supreme Court held that "if under the
facts and circumstances of the case, a reasonably prudent person
would have used a seat belt.., then the jury should be permitted to
consider this factor in assessing damages. ' 53 The Hutchins court
stated that its ruling reflects the reality that "automobile accidents are
foreseeable."' 54 If recognizing the foreseeability of automobile acci-
dents was the goal of the Hutchins ruling, why then did the court fail
to impose a bright-line standard of care contemplating seat belt use at
all times? Furthermore, why did the court undermine its ruling with
the qualifying phrase, "under the facts and circumstances of the case?"
This qualifying phrase lays the foundation for subjective and in-
consistent jury verdicts. 55 For example, unless a plaintiff were protect-
ing himself from a known danger, such as slippery roads, a jury would
be unable without the benefit of hindsight to make the determination
that, under the particular circumstances, a reasonably prudent person
would have used a seat belt. Because wearing a seat belt does not
protect against a particular hazard, a motorist's decision to buckle up
is an abstract one. Moreover, since negligence requires foreseeability,
51. See id. at 1204. ("Prevailing party status does not automatically follow if the
party receives an affirmative recovery but rather is based upon which party prevails on
the main issues." (citations omitted)).
52. Id. at 1199.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1198.
55. See Lipscomb v. Diamiani, 226 A.2d 914, 917 (Del. Super. Ct. 1967) ("To ask
the jury to [determine whether a failure to wear a seat belt constitutes a lack of due
care under particular circumstances] is to invite verdicts on prejudice and sympathy
contrary to the law.").
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"whether the [motorist] was contributorily negligent in failing to
fasten his seat belt, must, of course, be determined in view of his
knowledge of conditions prevailing prior to the accident, and not in
light of hindsight."'5 6 While a jury may conclude after a post-accident
appraisal that the injury would have been minimized had the plaintiff
been wearing a seat belt, such a determination relies entirely upon
hindsight57 and consequently has no bearing on whether the plaintiff
exercised due care under the circumstances. In fact, this inquiry
merely confuses the issue58 because it ignores that a motorist who be-
gins a journey without wearing a seat belt may have no opportunity to
put one on when danger becomes apparent. Thus, if the standard of
reasonable care requires seat belt use under certain circumstances and
if there is no practicable way to anticipate and prepare for those cir-
cumstances, then in actuality that standard of care requires use in all
circumstances, and non-use necessarily constitutes negligence per se.59
Nevertheless, the Alaska Supreme Court states that non-use can-
not constitute negligence per se unless the legislature enacts a
mandatory seat belt law.60 The Alaska Legislature specifically consid-
ered M-L and, with it, a standard of care that would require seat belt
use like that imposed by the Hutchins ruling.61 As evidenced by the
Hutchins ruling, the court ignored the legislative determination that a
law or standard of care mandating seat belt use would be inappropri-
ate. In spite of legislative opposition, the court embraced a standard
56. Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 231, 160 S.E.2d 65, 68 (1968).
57. Lafferty v. Allstate Ins. Co., 425 So. 2d 1147, 1149 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982),
rev'd on other grounds, 451 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1984).
58. In an area of the law where courts should strive to provide members of the
public with a standard of certainty against which to check their behavior, the inquiry
of whether under particular circumstances a plaintiff should have been wearing a seat
belt serves no apparent purpose. How will a plaintiff know if a jury will find that
particular circumstances warrant the use of a seat belt where other situations would
not? See Lipscomb, 226 A.2d at 918 (Declining to admit evidence of non-use absent
action by the legislature, the court stated: "An occupant of a car involved in normal,
everyday driving should either be required to wear a seat belt or he should not.").
59. Miller, 273 N.C. at 231, 160 S.E.2d at 68 (post-accident appraisal may always
be used to show that seat belt use would have minimized injuries; since the decision to
buckle up is abstract, an unbuckled motorist should be viewed as never negligent or as
always negligent; if an unbuckled motorist is always negligent, then failure to buckle
up constitutes negligence per se).
60. Hutchins v. Schwartz, 724 P.2d 1194, 1198 (Alaska 1986) (citing Bentzler v.
Braun, 34 Wis. 2d. 362, 149 N.W.2d 626 (1967)); Clarkson v. Wright, 108 Ill. 2d 129,
136, 483 N.E.2d 268, 271 (1985) (Ryan, J., dissenting) (absence of legislative mandate
to wear seat belts means only that failure to use one cannot constitute negligence per
se).
61. HOUSE J., 14th Leg., 2d Sess. 2984 (Apr. 29, 1986); see also Insurance Co. of
North America v. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d 447, 455 (Fla. 1984) (Shaw, J., dissenting)




of care that may indirectly coerce use by allowing evidence of non-use
to go to the jury.
The court's ruling also contradicts the longstanding tort principle
that one is not obliged to anticipate another's negligence 62 and con-
flicts with the traditional tort doctrine that the defendant must take
the plaintiff as he finds him.63 Inasmuch as these doctrines define rea-
sonable expectations, they affect human behavior and should not be
muddled by contradictions. As the Florida District Court stated in
Lafferty v. Allstate Insurance Co.: "Our rule has always been that the
lawful driving of an automobile is not negligence." r People assume,
and tend to conform their behavior to their assumption, that if they
obey the speed limit, follow traffic regulations, and maintain control of
their vehicles, they are doing what is expected and are not acting negli-
gently. The Hutchins ruling suggests that contrary to that assump-
tion, a plaintiff must hypothesize and take further steps to prepare for
all possible dangers before getting behind the wheel of an automobile.
It is no longer sufficient for Alaska motorists merely to comply with
the written regulations. Rather, Hutchins v. Schwartz suggests that to
immunize themselves from culpability, people must actively protect
themselves from other motorists' negligence by using all voluntary
safety devices that could affect the likelihood or degree of injury in the
event of an accident.
The court offered no single theory on which to base its decision.
Rather, it briefly discussed the foreseeability of automobile acci-
dents, 65 and that the failure to wear a seat belt creates an unnecessary
risk to motorists.66 In light of their conclusion that use is "more ad-
vantageous than non-use since it prevents serious injuries," the court
determined that the failure to wear a seat belt is relevant to the proper
apportionment of damages and such evidence should, therefore, be ad-
mitted into evidence. In making this ruling, the Hutchins court looked
with approval to the Wisconsin Supreme Court's recent decision in
62. Hutchins, 724 P.2d at 1197 ("Plaintiffs are not required to predict a defend-
ant's negligence.") (citing Amend v. Bell, 89 Wash. 2d 124, 132, 570 P.2d 138, 143
(1977)); see also Lipscomb v. Diamiani, 226 A.2d 914, 918 (Del. Super. Ct. 1967)
("failure to anticipate another's negligence is not negligence such as to defeat recovery
for injury sustained").
63. See Fischer v. Moore, 183 Colo. 392, 394, 517 P.2d 458, 459 (1977) ("Under
the common-law principles of tort law, it is axiomatic that the tortfeasor must accept
the plaintiff as he finds him .... ).
64. 425 So. 2d 1147, 1151 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 451
So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1984); see also Lipscomb, 226 A.2d at 916 (in Delaware, common law
duties of driving are limited to lookout and control).
65. Hutchins, 724 P.2d at 1198.
66. Id.
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Foley v. City of West Allis.67 This opinion sets forth the rationale that
a plaintiff's duty to mitigate damages requires damage reduction
where plaintiff's pre-injury conduct has aggravated the extent of the
damages. 68
The logical extension of this analysis illustrates its flaws. If a
plaintiff driving a convertible were involved in a traffic accident and
suffered injuries caused primarily by driving with the top down, the
mitigation of damages theory would preclude recovery to the extent
that injury could have been avoided by the plaintiff's raising the top
prior to the injury.69 The same inequity results where a bicyclist, rid-
ing without a helmet, is injured by a negligent defendant. Under the
mitigation of damages theory, damages in such a case are reduced to
the extent that they would have been avoided had a helmet been
worn. 70 A more extreme case is presented by the hypothetical situa-
tion of a motorist who decides to take a drive at 12:00 a.m. on January
1 and whose car is hit by a drunk driver.71 As it is common knowl-
edge that many inebriated people drive on New Year's Eve, a logical
conclusion can be drawn that the motorist should have refrained from
driving on such a dangerous night. Under the Foley rationale, should
not the damages reduction theory preclude recovery?
The logical extension of this rationale to the above hypotheticals
would be consistent with the court's ruling in Hutchins, and to deny
recovery to the driver of the convertible, the bicycle rider, and the
New Year's Eve motorist, for injuries that were caused by pre-injury
conduct, would be inequitable. In all three cases, the defendant was
completely at fault for the accident, while the plaintiff merely fur-
nished a condition that aggravated the injuries sustained. Therefore,
denying even partial recovery on that basis would be tantamount to
restricting the inquiry on the issue of negligence to the sole query of
67. 113 Wis. 2d 475, 484, 335 N.W.2d 824, 828 (holding that "those who fail to
use available seat belts should be held responsible for the incremental harm caused by
their failure to wear available seat belts").
68. Id. at 487, 335 N.W.2d at 830 (quoting W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 65, at
423-24 (4th ed. 1976)).
69. Cf Lafferty v. Allstate Ins. Co., 425 So. 2d 1147, 1151 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982), rev'd on other grounds, 451 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1984) ("[A] tortfeasor takes his
plaintiff as he finds him .... Were we to admit evidence of non-use of seat belts, we
may well be obligated to admit evidence of other pre-accident conduct dealing with
safety issues. For example, numerous studies have shown that standard-size cars are
safer than compact or sub-compact cars. Should a plaintiff be penalized for not taking
this safety factor into consideration when purchasing a car?").
70. Bicycle riders are not legally required to wear helmets; however, a helmet is a
recognized safety device.
71. See generally Lafferty v. Allstate Ins. Co. 425 So. 2d 1147, 1151 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 451 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1984).
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causal connection, 72 and ignoring a widely accepted prerequisite for a
finding of negligence-fault.73
In recognition of the necessity of a prerequisite finding of fault for
a finding of negligence, the Colorado Supreme Court, in Fischer v.
Moore,74 awarded full recovery to a plaintiff injured in a traffic acci-
dent, despite the plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt. The court
stated:
[T]he tortfeasor may not rely upon the injured party's failure to util-
ize a voluntary protective device to escape all or a portion of the
damages which the plaintiff incurred as a consequence of defend-
ant's negligence.... If we were to hold otherwise, the person who
was driving a Volkswagen, and not a Mack Truck, could be said to
be more vulnerable to injury and, therefore guilty of contributing to
his own injury as a matter of law. Such a result would be contrary
to the entire "fault" philosophy which is found throughout the law
of tort.
7 5
In State v. Kaat, 76 the Alaska Supreme Court recognized the
proposition that fault, rather than physical causation, was the element
to be allocated in negligence cases. Therefore, the question becomes
whether a plaintiff who fails to wear a seat belt is at fault for the result-
ing injuries. According to the Alaska Supreme Court's analysis in
Hutchins, a plaintiff who fails to wear a seat belt may be at fault for the
resulting injuries. Whether fault for the injuries should be attributed
to the plaintiff depends on the jury's finding that under the particular
circumstances, a plaintiff who fails to buckle up is or is not exercising
due care for safety. Some people may believe that the jury should be
permitted to consider objectively the factor of use or non-use. The
mere introduction of such evidence, however, is unavoidably sugges-
tive of a judicial consensus that non-use constitutes culpable conduct,
for if the failure to wear a seat belt were not considered to be culpable
conduct, then evidence pertaining to non-use would be irrelevant and
hence inadmissible. The Alaska Supreme Court's statement in Kaatz,
that in determining negligence the proper inquiry rests on fault, serves
to encourage the perception that a plaintiff's non-use constitutes fault.
Thus, assuming that the court did not intend for physical causation to
be the sole measure of negligence, the Hutchins court must have con-
cluded implicitly that a plaintiff is at fault for injuries traceable to the
failure to wear a seat belt.
72. The sole query would be the causal connection with respect to injury sus-
tained rather than the accident itself.
73. State v. Kaatz, 572 P.2d 775, 782 (Alaska 1977). In adopting comparative
negligence, the Alaska Supreme Court held that fault rather than physical causation
was to be allocated in negligence cases. Id.
74. 183 Colo. 392, 517 P.2d 458 (1973).
75. Id. at 394-95, 517 P.2d at 459 (citations omitted).
76. 572 P.2d 776 (Alaska 1977).
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Not every new safety device becomes enmeshed in the expected
standard of conduct until a certain threshold of acceptance is met,
either legally (through legislative regulation) or socially (through pub-
lic acceptance and adoption).77 Alaska has no MUL. Does a plain-
tiff's failure to wear a seat belt, therefore, constitute a failure to
conform to the standard of care exercised by a reasonably prudent
person?78
In making its determination that evidence of non-use should be
submitted to the jury, the Hutchins court considered the foreseeability
of automobile accidents, the availability of seat belts, and public
knowledge concerning their effectiveness. Each of these factors is rele-
vant to the question of whether the failure to wear a seat belt consti-
tuted a lack of due care. Nevertheless, the only factor actually
indicative of the care exercised by the ordinary person is custom.
Although customary conduct is not conclusive on the issue of due
care, custom influences the standard of care for purposes of determin-
ing negligence. 79 Moreover, custom is typically accepted as conclusive
on the issue of due care in activities engaged in by the general public.80
Customary conduct, by definition, sets the standard followed by the
reasonably prudent person. Unless the Alaska Supreme Court wishes
to impose a higher standard of care based on the behavior of a ficti-
tious reasonably prudent person, general custom with respect to seat
belt use should be recognized as the appropriate standard of conduct
against which negligent behavior should be measured.81 As stated in
McCord v. Green, 8 2 "to hold that failure to use a seat belt amounts to
negligence assumes that the usual practice of car drivers and passen-
gers is to use these devices." '83
Statistics do not exist that address the degree of seat belt use in
the entire State of Alaska. However, an unpublished report prepared
for Alaska's Department of Public Safety and based on a study con-
ducted from May 1985 to May 1986, concludes that the majority of
77. See Fields v. Volkswagen of America, 555 P.2d 48, 61 (Okla. 1976).
78. Amend v. Bell, 89 Wash. 2d 124, 132, 570 P.2d 138, 143 (1977) (premise of
negligence is that the actor has a legally imposed duty or standard of conduct to which
he has failed to conform).
79. Mitchell v. Knight, 394 P.2d 892, 895 (Alaska 1964); Coats & Clark, Inc. v.
Gay, 755 F.2d 1506 (1lth Cir. 1985) (evidence of custom is admissible as bearing on
standard of care).
80. Ellis v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad, 251 S.W.2d 577, 579 (Ky. 1952); G.
CHRISTIE, THE LAW OF TORTS 193 (1983).
81. See generally Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 238, 160 S.E.2d 65, 73 (1968)
(since due care is measured by customary conduct of reasonably prudent person, and
average motorist does not typically use seat belt, no duty should be imposed upon
motorists to use seat belts).
82. 362 A.2d 720 (D.C. 1976).
83. Id. at 725.
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Anchorage adults occupying front seats of motor vehicles do not wear
their seat belts. 84 The study shows an average seat belt use rate in
Anchorage of slightly more than thirty-three percent for drivers and
thirty-one percent for front seat passengers. 85 The validity of these
statistics is bolstered by the National Highway Traffic Safety Adminis-
tration's ("NHTSA") nineteen cities survey, which found a seat belt
use rate of twenty-seven percent among cities without MUL in effect. 86
The NHTSA survey suggests that seat belt use is higher in cities
than in rural areas.8 7 The seat belt use rate for Anchorage, therefore,
could be attributed to all of Alaska. Assuming the accuracy of this
inference, one could conclude that more than half of all Alaska motor-
ists do not wear seat belts. A negligent defendant in Alaska, conse-
quently, would have no reason to believe that a motorist would be
wearing a seat belt.
A negligent defendant is liable for foreseeable damages caused by
that negligence. Because non-use is customary in Alaska, foreseeable
results of a defendant's negligence would include the enhanced dam-
ages that result from non-use. Thus, a negligent defendant, driving in
a jurisdiction such as Alaska where customary conduct does not in-
clude seat belt use, has constructive warning of the likelihood that
damages resulting from an accident will be higher than if the defend-
ant were driving in a jurisdiction where it was customary for the gen-
eral public to use seat belts.
Since it is the defendant's negligence that proximately causes the
accident that results in the plaintiff's injuries, a negligent defendant is
required to anticipate and compensate the plaintiff for the foreseeable
consequences of the negligence. An injured plaintiff, on the other
hand, is not required to anticipate a defendant's negligence.88 There-
fore, under well-established tort law, the enhanced damages resulting
from the failure to wear a seat belt would not be foreseeable to an
innocent plaintiff. As explained above, in Alaska, a plaintiff's failure
to wear a seat belt is foreseeable to a defendant. Tort law and com-
mon sense support the conclusion that a plaintiff's failure to buckle up
is more foreseeable and knowledge of it more fairly attributable to a
defendant, than a future accident would be foreseeable or more fairly
attributable to a plaintiff. Logically, then, it is more equitable for the
84. R. McKnight, Seatbelt Use Among Anchorage Adults, Results of 8 Observa-
tion Studies and 5 Telephone Surveys, Conducted May 1985 to May 1986, at 9 (un-
published report prepared for the Highway Safety Planning Agency, Dep't of Pub.
Safety).
85. Id.
86. See supra note 31.
87. Id.
88. Schmitzer v. Musener-Bennett Ford, Inc., 135 Mich. App. 350, 359, 354
N.W.2d 336, 340 (1984).
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culpable defendant to bear the cost of the foreseeable consequences of
negligence.
Moreover, as the study of seat belt use in Anchorage suggests, a
majority of people do not wear seat belts. Thus, the failure to buckle
up does not fall below the standard of care of a reasonably prudent
person and is not culpable conduct. Absent MUL or a standard of
care requiring use that is accepted by a majority of the general public,
a motorist's failure to wear a seat belt should be treated no differently
from the decision to drive a convertible; no legal justification exists for
penalizing either choice.
IV. PUBLIC POLICY AND THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH
Perhaps the Hutchins court's ruling relies for support on a public
policy argument. Justice Shaw of the Supreme Court of Florida prob-
ably would agree; he argued in his dissent in Pasakarnis that the ab-
sence of MUL in Florida and the lack of widespread public acceptance
and use of the seat belt show that the judicial ruling admitting evi-
dence of non-use to the jury was based on a public policy determina-
tion.89 At least three public policy considerations would support the
admission of such evidence: a method of promoting safety by deter-
ring non-use;90 a method of controlling insurance and other economic
costs of automobile accidents by capping damage awards; and a
method of penalizing undesirable conduct by refusing compensation
for enhanced damages caused by non-use.
Many of the courts that have considered the seat belt issue have
deferred to a determination by their state legislatures due to the nature
of the question involved.91 In Fischer v. Moore,92 the Colorado
Supreme Court stated: "We are not inclined to alter the common law
in the face of the legislature's failure to act in order to create a negli-
gence which is wholly grounded in public policy considerations. ' 93 By
contrast, the Alaska Supreme Court not only failed to defer to the
89. Insurance Co. of North America v. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d 447, 455-56 (Fla.
1984) (Shaw, J., dissenting); see also, Fischer v. Moore, 183 Colo. 392, 396, 517 P.2d
458, 460 (1973) ("[lit is apparent that the acceptance of the seat belt defense can only
be justified as a deviation from common-law negligence on a public policy theory.").
90. See Foley v. City of West Allis, 113 Wis. 2d 475, 489, 335 N.W.2d 824, 831
(1983) (court expresses hope that motorists will be encouraged to wear safety devices
if the potential for compensation is decreased).
91. See Fischer v. Moore, 183 Colo. 392, 396, 517 P.2d 458, 460 (1973); Kopishke
v. First Continental Corp., 187 Mont. 471, 500, 610 P.2d 681, 683 (1980); Miller v.
Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 235, 160 S.E.2d 65, 71 (1968) (citing Lipscomb v. Diamiani, 226
A.2d 914, 917-18 (Del. Super. Ct. 1967)); Fields v. Volkswagen of America, 555 P.2d
48, 62 (Okla. 1976); Robinson v. Lewis, 254 Or. 52, 57, 457 P.2d 483, 485 (1969).
92. 183 Colo. 392, 517 P.2d 458 (1973).
93. Id. at 396, 517 P.2d at 460.
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Alaska Legislature's determination that the failure to wear a seat belt
should not be punished, but the court even neglected to mention the
Alaska Legislature's recent and aborted efforts at enacting seat belt
legislation.
While several commentators and judges have disapproved ofjudi-
cial involvement in public policy decisions,94 their arguments have not
put an end to the practice. Admittedly, in complex areas of the law, it
is unrealistic to expect the judiciary to ignore technological and eco-
nomic realities in rendering its decisions. 95 Certain limitations, how-
ever, exist on the types of factors that the judiciary may take into
account in reaching its decisions. These limitations reflect the fact
that the judiciary is an administrative organ with little training in ar-
eas outside the law and limited access to information necessary to
making informed policy decisions. In addition to its lack of expertise
in the public policy arena, the judiciary is limited in its scope of power
by the three-branch structure of government. Each branch is designed
to fulfill particular functions and purposes, and in order for the system
to operate smoothly, the branches of government must act without
interference from the others.96 Additionally, the democratic system of
government envisions that certain determinations be left to duly
elected representatives of the people, further limiting the proper scope
of judicial action.97 Although these guidelines are flexible and open to
personal interpretation and application, they are important and must
be preserved because they set forth the fundamental principles on
which our system of government is based.
In deciding to admit to the jury evidence of a plaintiff's failure to
wear a seat belt, absent MUL, the Alaska Supreme Court has neces-
sarily injected a public policy element into its decisionmaking process.
Whether the court focuses on the relative ease of fastening a seat belt
94. See, e.g., D. O'BRIEN, THE COURTS AND SCIENCE POLICY DISPUTES: A RE-
VIEW AND COMMENTARY ON THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN REGULATORY POLl-
TIcS 13 ("[T]he judiciary seems an inauspicious forum for public policy
formulation."); see generally supra notes 89 and 91.
95. E.g., Weinberg v. Dinger, 106 N.J. 469, 524 A.2d 366 (1987) (abrogating the
long-standing immunity enjoyed by private water companies and denying their liabil-
ity for subrogated claims asserted by fire insurance carriers, the court considered the
likely economic impact on water rates).
96. See generally Lipscomb v. Diamiani, 226 A.2d 914 (Del. Super. Ct. 1967)
("There can be little question but that the legislative forum is a better one to explore
the area than the isolated courtroom.").
97. State v. Banks, 454 S.W.2d 498, 500-01 (Mo. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 991
(1971) ("For any one of three equal branches of government to police or supervise the
operations of the others strikes at the very heart and core of the entire structure.")
(quoting 16 AM. JUR. 2D Const. Law § 213 (1979)); see also O'BRIEN, supra note 94,
at 115 ("Judges are neither elected nor directly politically accountable; yet they are
permitted to render major public policy decisions.").
[Vol. 4:387
MANDA TORY SEA T BELT USE
and the consequent safety benefit realized, or simply the risk created
by non-use, the rationale for allowing non-use to affect a damage
award is not offered by a legal principle. It, however, may be provided
by the fact that the public policy of encouraging safe driving supports
the ruling.
In Spier v. Barker,98 the New York Court of Appeals acknowl-
edged that the seat belt defense did not fit within the traditional legal
doctrine of damages mitigation, but decided to admit evidence of non-
use on the policy grounds that the seat belt is a unique device which
enables a motorist to minimize injuries prior to an accident. 99 In Foley
v. City of West Allis, 100 the Wisconsin Supreme Court emphasized that
public policy favoring the encouragement of seat belt use provided a
good reason for reducing recovery for injuries sustained due to non-
use.101 In Insurance Co. of North America v. Pasakarnis, 102 the Flor-
ida Supreme Court explored the increased role of the automobile in
society, as well as recent technological advancements, to justify its de-
cision to admit evidence to the jury of a plaintiff's failure to use a seat
belt.10 3 In Hutchins v. Schwartz, the Alaska Supreme Court took what
would have been a logical step for the Alaska Legislature had the leg-
islature concluded, as the court did, that the failure to wear a seat belt
is unreasonable conduct. 104 Moreover, the court acknowledged that
because the trial court had directed a verdict on the seat belt issue, a
determination of the extent to which seat belt use is relevant evidence
was unnecessary. 10 5 The Hutchins ruling, like the Spier, Foley, and
Pasakarnis rulings, was based upon public policy considerations.
While all four rulings can be criticized for relying on public pol-
icy, only the Hutchins decision is legally objectionable. What distin-
guishes the Hutchins ruling is that it was made in spite of a recent
policy decision by the Alaska Legislature not to create a legal duty to
wear seat belts. The Alaska Legislature considered the benefits of a
policy of penalizing non-use in CSHB 224, and declined to adopt the
bill. The reasons for the bill's failure are speculative. The fact re-
mains, however, that the elected legislature declined to pass MUL or
to impose penalties for non-use, in spite of any countervailing policy
considerations. The Hutchins court should have interpreted this legis-
lative action, or inaction, as a clear statement of Alaska's seat belt
policy.
98. 35 N.Y.2d 444, 323 N.E.2d 164, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1974).
99. Id. at 452, 323 N.E.2d at 168, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 922.
100. 113 Wis. 2d 475, 335 N.W.2d 824 (1983).
101. Id. at 489, 335 N.W.2d at 831.
102. 451 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1984).
103. Id. at 451.
104. 724 P.2d 1194, 1198 (Alaska 1986).
105. Id. at 1199.
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When no precedent exists, a court may justifiably take public pol-
icy into account in formulating a decision. It is a different matter for a
court of law to forgo legal justification for a ruling and rely exclusively
on public policy considerations, as the court perceives them. When
the results of a court's policy-induced decision are contrary to those
contemplated by the legislature, and when a court ignores a legislative
mandate, criticism is particularly justified.
While several of the courts that considered the seat belt defense
decided to wait for their legislatures to act, the Alaska Supreme Court
stated: "We find it unnecessary to wait for legislative action on this
subject."10 6 The court ignored the fact that the legislature had acted
in voting not to adopt MUL. By completely disregarding the legisla-
tive decision not to pass CSHB 224, and not to impose penalties for
non-use, the court violated the spirit of the three-branch structure of
government. The Alaska Supreme Court should not have substituted
its judgment on the seat belt issue for the judgment exercised by the
policymaking branch of the Alaska government.
V. CONCLUSION
In the Hutchins opinion, the Alaska Supreme Court failed to ar-
ticulate any legal grounds for its decision that evidence of a plaintiff's
failure to wear a seat belt may be admitted into evidence. Rather, the
court relied exclusively on public policy considerations to rule in a
manner that may coerce seat belt use by penalizing non-use in negli-
gence cases. This note concludes that in light of the contrary public
policy reflected in the failure of CSHB 224 to pass the Alaska Legisla-
ture, the Hutchins court should have, in the absence of countervailing
legal principles, deferred to the Alaska Legislature. The Alaska
Supreme Court should have found non-use to be irrelevant to the issue
of due care and should not have ruled to admit evidence to the jury of
a plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt.
Terri Stein
106. Id. at 1198.
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